Regulation of Physician Self-Referral Arrangements: Is Prohibition the Answer Or Has Congress Operated on the Wrong Patient by Humphreys, Christian D.
Comments
Regulation of Physician Self-Referral
Arrangements: Is Prohibition the Answer
or Has Congress Operated
on the Wrong Patient?
Rapidly increasing health care costs have created a national
crisis. Perceiving physician referral behavior as the principal
cause, Congress and several state legislatures have prohibited cer-
tain referrals. This Comment analyzes the data that spawned such
legislation and critiques prohibition as a solution to the crisis.
The article asserts that the prohibition remedy is overly broad and
largely ineffective. A more farsighted solution, such as the crea-
tion of a prepaid physician compensation system, is necessary.
This system would minimize the incentive to make unnecessary
referrals while simultaneously reducing the level of health care
costs borne by the government.
I. INTRODUCTION
Health care costs in the United States are increasing at a stagger-
ing rate. Americans spent over $600 billion on health care in 1989.1
Only three years later, in 1992, costs were projected to exceed $800
billion (roughly fourteen percent of the Gross National Product), of
which twenty-five percent may be waste.' At the present rate of
1. James B. Couch, The Potential Role of Corporate America in Ameliorating the
Medical Liability Problem, 15 J. MED. & PHIL. 243 (1990).
2. Wasted Health Care Dollars, 57 CONSUMER REP. 435 (July 1992). This article
contends that waste, in the form of unnecessary care and bureaucratic inefficiency, adds
growth, health care costs are predicted to exceed $1.2 trillion by
1995 and $2.5 trillion by 2001.3
The increasing cost of health care has not gone unnoticed by the
federal government, insurers, and third-party payors. The most sig-
nificant pressure has been applied by the federal government. In an
effort to control spiraling Medicare costs, Congress, in 1983, enacted
legislation that changed the form of Medicare reimbursement.4 Prior
to the 1983 amendments, hospitals were reimbursed by the federal
government for the actual dollar amount incurred in the treatment
of a Medicare patient.5 The 1983 amendments created the Medicare
Prospective Payment System, under which reimbursement is a fixed,
predetermined amount. The predetermined amount is calculated by
reference to the average cost of treating a patient in a particular
Diagnostic-Related Group, regardless of the actual cost of treating
the patient.6
As a result, the practice of medicine has undergone dramatic
changes. Many services previously resigned to hospitals are now
commonly performed in outpatient settings.7 The increasing use of
outpatient facilities, along with cost containment measures directed
toward physician salaries and the introduction of expensive new
technology, has created incentives for physicians to invest in facilities
that provide services once delivered only in hospitals.8
Because physicians have the ability to refer patients to health care
facilities in which they have an ownership interest,9 thereby poten-
tially increasing their own financial well being, physician ownership
of these facilities has sparked considerable debate. Critics argue that
$200 billion to health care costs each year. Id. at 436-37. Consumer Reports estimates
that unnecessary care and administrative inefficiency result in extra health care costs of
$130 billion and $70 billion, respectively. Id.
3. Couch, supra note 1, at 243.
4. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21 § 601, 97 Stat. 65, 149
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1983)).
5. David A. Hyman & Joel V. Williamson, Fraud and Abuse: Regulatory Alterna-
tives in a "Competitive" Health Care Era, 19 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1133, 1138-39 (1988).
6. Id.
7. Because the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) applies only to inpa-
tient hospital services and the costs of these services often exceed the reimbursed amount,
treatment in outpatient settings has greatly increased. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN-
ERAL, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN PHYSI-
CIANS AND HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES 1 (May 1989) [hereinafter OIG REPORT]. For a
general discussion of the effects of PPS on the practice of medicine, see Hyman & Wil-
liamson, supra note 5.
8. OIG REPORT, supra note 7, at 1-2.
9. One commentator estimates that physicians control up to 80% of health care
spending. E. Haavi Morreim, Conflicts of Interest: Profits and Problems in Physician
Referrals, 262 JAMA 390, 392 (1989). See also Wasted Health Care Dollars, supra
note 2, at 438 (referring to a physician's ability to control both the supply and demand of
health care services as the "law of induced demand").
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these arrangements result in the overutilization of services and cre-
ate an unethical conflict of interest for the referring physicians. 10
Those who support physician ownership contend that it stimulates
competition, resulting in superior and less costly care, and often pro-
vides much needed services."2
In December 1989, federal legislation, sponsored by California
Congressman Fortney "Pete" Stark (and generally referred to as the
Stark Law), was passed making referrals of Medicare patients by
physicians to clinical laboratories in which they have an ownership
interest or compensation arrangement illegal.'2 The patient referral
10. See COMMITTEE ON IMPLICATIONS OF FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH
CARE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, PHYSICIANS AND ENTREPRENEURISM IN HEALTH CARE
151, 158-59 (B. Gray ed. 1986) [hereinafter INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE]; Arnold S.
Relman, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 749 (1985); Arnold
S. Relman, Practicing Medicine in the New Business Climate, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1150 (1987). Overutilization (the provision of unnecessary or inappropriate care) in-
creases the cost of health care. Although the conflict of interest issue is also important,
the focus of this Comment is on the economic, rather than the ethical, effects of physi-
cian self-referrals.
11. See The Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1989, Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Health and the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 101st Cong. Ist Sess. 90, 92 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of the
American Medical Association); Hearings, supra, at 111 (statement of the American
Imaging Association).
12. Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, Title VI, §
6204(a), 103 Stat. 2236 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1989)) [hereinafter STARK
LAW].
Section 1395nn provides, in pertinent part:
Limitation on certain physician referrals
(a) Prohibition of certain referrals
(1) In general. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, if a
physician (or immediate family member of such physician) has a financial
relationship with an entity specified in paragraph (2), then-
(A) the physician may not make a referral to the entity for the
furnishing of clinical laboratory services for which payment other-
wise may be made under this subehapter, and
(B) the entity may not present or cause to be presented a claim
under this subchapter or bill to an individual, third party payor, or
other entity for clinical laboratory services furnished pursuant to a
referral prohibited under subparagraph (A).
(2) Financial relationship specified. For purposes of this section, a finan-
cial relationship of a physician (or immediate family member) with an
entity specified in this paragraph is-
(A) except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, an
ownership or investment interest in the entity; or
(B) except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, a compensa-
tion arrangement (as defined in subsection (h)(1)(A) between the
physician ( or immediate family member) and the entity. An own-
ership or investment interest described in subparagraph (A) may be
through equity, debt, or other means.
prohibitions contained in the Stark Law became effective on January
1, 1992.13 This Comment will analyze: (1) the perceived need for
regulation of physician self-referral arrangements, 14 (2) the appro-
priateness of the Stark Law as a response to the perceived need,1
(3) subsequent legislation directed at physician self-referral arrange-
ments, 16 and (4) whether there may be a more effective means of
containing health care costs. 17 Finally, this Comment will conclude
that the Stark Law is overly broad and is unlikely to result in a
significant reduction of the federal government's health care costs.
II. BACKGROUND
To fully understand the current self-referral controversy, a basic
knowledge of the previous regulatory attempts to prohibit payments
made in return for patient referrals is necessary. Accordingly, a brief
chronology of legislative and regulatory attempts, as well as the cor-
responding judicial interpretations, follows.
A. Legislative Guidelines
Legislative efforts to prevent financial incentives from influencing
a physician's referral decisions is not a recent phenomenon. In 1972,
Congress made its first legislative attempt to combat Medicare 18-
Medicaid"9 fraud and abuse by making it a misdemeanor to solicit,
offer, pay, or receive a kickback or bribe in connection with the fur-
nishing of items or services paid for by Medicare or Medicaid. 20
Dissatisfied with the ability of the 1972 provisions to prevent fraud
and abuse,21 Congress enacted the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud
and Abuse Amendments of 1977.2 The Amendments strengthened
13. Id.
14. For the purposes 'of this Comment the terms "physician self-referral arrange-
ments" and "self-referrals" have been used to describe arrangements involving referrals
to an entity in which the referring physician has an ownership interest. For analysis of
the perceived need for regulation of physician self-referral arrangements, see infra notes
63-85 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 99-130 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 131-51 and accompanying text.
18. Medicare is a federal program that reimburses health care providers for pro-
viding various health services to qualifying patients (generally the aged and disabled).
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395cce (1988 & Supp. 1990).
19. Medicaid provides federal funds to eligible state programs. Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396u (1988 & Supp. 1990).
20. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242, 86 Stat.
1419 (1972).
21. For a detailed discussion of the congressional intent behind the amendments,
see Hyman & Williamson, supra note 5, at 1151-85.
22. Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142,
91 Stat. 1175 (1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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the 1972 provisions by broadening and clarifying the prohibited con-
duct, as well as increasing the penalties for violation.23
The Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute was again
amended in 1980 and 1987. The 1980 Amendments added a specific
intent requirement that the violation be done "knowingly and will-
fully. '"24 In 1987, Congress enacted the Medicare and Medicaid Pa-
tient and Program Protection Act (MMPPPA).25 The MMPPPA
was significant for several reasons. First, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services was authorized to exclude a person found to have
violated the statute from participation in the Medicare or Medicaid
program.2 6 Because Medicare covers as much as forty percent of
health care expenditures in the United States,27 exclusion of a physi-
cian from participation in the program could be the financial
equivalent of the death penalty. Second, the statute mandated the
promulgation of regulations under the statute.28
This mandate resulted in the Safe Harbor Regulations. The Safe
Harbor Regulations were intended to specify "various payment prac-
tices which, although potentially capable of inducing referrals of
business under Medicare or a State health care program, will be pro-
tected from criminal prosecution or civil sanctions under the anti-
kickback provisions of the [Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and
Abuse] statute."29 The Safe Harbor Regulations are narrowly drawn
and provide sanctuary for physician investment in entities to which
they make referrals in only one instance: investment in an entity
with assets of more than $50,000,000 whose stock is available to the
23. The 1977 Amendments replaced the words "kickback" or "bribe" with the
more inclusive term, "remuneration" (defined to include kickbacks, bribes, and rebates
made either directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind). Id. § 4, 91 Stat.
1180. In addition, the 1977 Amendments made violation a felony punishable by a fine of
up to $25,000 and imprisonment for up to five years per claim. Id.
24. Medicare and Medicaid Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 917, 94
Stat. 2599, 2625 (1980).
25. Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-93, 101 Stat. 680 (1987).
26. Pub. L. No. 100-93, § 2, 101 Stat. 680, 680-86 (1987).
27. Morreim, supra note 9, at 393.
28. Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-93 § 14, 101 Stat. 680, 697 (1987).
29. Safe Harbor Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35952 (1991) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 1001). The breadth of the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute
has caused considerable concern among health care providers that "many relatively in-
nocuous, or even beneficial, commercial arrangements are technically covered by the stat-
ute and are, therefore, subject to criminal prosecution." Id. Apparently, the Safe Harbor
Regulations were intended to allay these concerns.
general public through trading on a registered national securities ex-
change such as the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock
Exchange, or the National Association of Securities Dealers Auto-
mated Quotation System.30
If a physician is involved in an arrangement that fully complies
with a Safe Harbor provision, then he or she can be assured that the
arrangement will not be prosecuted either criminally or civilly.31
When an arrangement fails to fully comply, one of three things can
happen. First, the Medicare-Medicaid Fraud and Abuse Statute
may not apply because the arrangement is not intended to induce a
referral of business that is reimbursable by Medicare or Medicaid. 32
In this case, there is no reason to comply with the Safe Harbor Reg-
ulations. 33 Second, the arrangement could be a clear statutory viola-
tion making prosecution very likely.34 Third, the arrangement could
be a less clear violation. Here, the provider is not exempt from prose-
cution, which may or may not occur.35 Thus, except in a very limited
number of circumstances, the Safe Harbor Regulations have done
nothing to alleviate the uncertainty which prompted their
promulgation.
Although the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute
sought to prevent financial incentives from influencing a physician's
referral decisions, it did not completely prohibit self-referral ar-
rangements. Prior to the enactment of the Stark Law, federal legis-
lation employed the complete prohibition alternative only in the
context of home intravenous (IV) therapy. The prohibition was part
of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA).36 The
MCCA generally prohibited a home IV therapy provider from ren-
dering seivices to a Medicare patient if the patient was referred by a
physician who had a financial relationship with the provider.3 In ad-
dition, the MCCA also mandated that the Office of the Inspector
General, Department of Health and Human Services, study the po-
tential of physician ownership of entities to influence the decision of
30. Id. at 35984.




35. Id. The General Comments to the Safe Harbor Regulations acknowledge that
the risk of prosecution in this situation is impossible to predict. Id.
36. Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 203(d), 102 Stat. 683, 722-23 (1988) (codified as 42
U.S.C. § 1395m), repealed by Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Repeal Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 101-234, 103 Stat. 1979 (1989).
37. Id. For further discussion of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, see
Theodore N. McDowell, Jr., Physician Self Referral Arrangements: Legitimate Business
or Unethical "Entrepreneurialism," 15 Am. J.L. & MED. 61, 76-77 (1989).
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a physician regarding referrals leading to the inappropriate utiliza-
tion of these items and services.38
On February 9, 1989, Congressman Stark introduced the Ethics in
Patient Referrals Act of 1989. 39 Originally, the bill was very broad,
prohibiting a physician from referring a Medicare patient to any
health care entity with which the physician or an immediate family
member has a financial arrangement.40 However, the Stark Law, as
enacted on December 19, 1989, prohibits self-referrals only to
clinical laboratories.4'
B. Judicial Application
Efforts by the courts to apply the Medicare Fraud and Abuse
Statute has led to considerable confusion. In early cases, the statute
was interpreted narrowly.42 Recent cases, however, indicate a judi-
cial willingness to give the Medicare Fraud and Abuse Statute a
broader interpretation.43 A summary of these recent cases follows.
In United States v. Greber,44 Cardio-Med, Inc., which provided
38. § 203, 102 Stat. at 724 (1988). More specifically, the Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) was required to conduct a study and report to Congress on:
(A)physician ownership of, or compensation from, an entity providing items or
services to which the physician makes referrals and for which payment may be
made under the Medicare program;
(B)the range of such arrangements and the means by which they are marketed
to physicians;
(C)the potential of such ownership or compensation to influence the decision of
a physician regarding referrals and to lead to inappropriate utilization of such
items and services; and
(D)the practical difficulties involved in enforcement actions against such own-
ership and compensation arrangements that violate current anti-kickback
provisions.
Id. For a discussion of the OIG's findings, see infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
39. INTRODUCTION OF THE ETHICS IN PATIENT REFERRALS ACT, 135 CONG. REC.
H240 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1989).
40. Id. at H241.
41. See STARK LAW, supra note 12. The reduction in scope was the result of a last
minute compromise between Representatives Stark, Bentsen, Rostenkowski, and Dingell.
See John K. Inglehart, Congress Moves to Regulate Self-Referral and Physicians' Own-
ership of Clinical Laboratories, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1682, 1684-85 (1990).
42. See United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912 (2nd Cir. 1978) (holding that
charging Medicaid patients four dollars per day more than the Medicaid allotment did
not increase the cost to the government of patient care, decrease the quality of patient
care purchased by the government, or involve the misapplication of government funds);
United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that payment of a han-
dling fee to physicians for blood samples sent to a laboratory did not constitute a kick-
back, bribe, or rebate).
43. See infra notes 44-62 and accompanying text.
44. 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985).
cardiac monitoring devices and services, paid a portion of its Medi-
care reimbursement to the referring physicians. 45 The payment to
the referring physician, classified by the defendant as an "interpreta-
tion fee," allegedly represented compensation for the physician's ini-
tial consultation services, as well as for explaining the test results to
the patient.46 At trial, evidence was presented showing that physi-
cians received the interpretation fee even though some of them did
not evaluate the test data.47
Dr. Greber, Cardio-Med's owner, was indicted for violating the
statute, making false statements to Medicare, and committing mail
fraud.48 In his defense, Dr. Greber argued that the payments made
to the referring physicians were for services actually rendered and,
as such, could not be a violation of the statute.49 The court was not
persuaded by this argument and held that "if one purpose of the
payment was to induce future referrals, the [M]edicare statute has
been violated." 50 Further, the court held that the Medicare statute
would be violated "even if the payments were also intended to com-
pensate for professional services." 51
In United States v. Kats,5 2 the defendant owned a twenty-five per-
cent interest in a community medical clinic.53 The clinic sent labora-
tory samples to a diagnostic laboratory, which agreed to forward to
the owners of the clinic fifty percent of all Medicare payments re-
ceived for work performed on the clinic samples.5 4 At trial, Kats was
convicted of receiving kickbacks in exchange for referrals. 5 On ap-
peal, the court adopted the interpretation of Greber and held that
the Medicare Anti-Fraud Statute is violated if "'one purpose of the
payment was to induce future referrals ... even if the payments
were also intended to compensate for professional services.' "56
Although the holdings in Greber and Kats were very broad, the
facts indicated that the Medicare Fraud and Abuse Statute had
clearly been violated. In Greber, the referring physicians were paid
an interpretation fee even though Dr. Greber, and not the referring
physicians, interpreted the test data. Similarly, the defendants in
Kats received fifty percent of the Medicare reimbursement paid to




49. Id. at 71.
50. Id. at 69.
51. Id. at 72.
52. 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989).
53. Id. at 107.
54. Id. at 106-07.
55. Id. at 106.
56. Id. at 108 (quoting United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 69, 72 (3rd cir.
1985)).
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the laboratory to which the defendants referred their samples.
However, in a subsequent case the First Circuit of the United
States Court of Appeals was faced with a less compelling set of
facts. In United States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hospital Rental
Service, Inc.,17 no referral was made and no direct connection was
established between referral and compensation. Here, a hospital em-
ployee was retained as a consultant by an ambulance company.58
The ambulance company paid the hospital employee for "consulting
services" and for developing a computer program (these services
were in fact rendered). 59 Using his influence as a member of various
hospital committees, the defendant helped the ambulance company
secure a contract with the hospital.60 The defendant and an ambu-
lance company official were convicted of conspiring to commit Medi-
care fraud under the Fraud and Abuse Statute.61 Although the
Greber court held that any inducement intended to influence refer-
rals is illegal even if it is also intended to compensate for professional
services, the Bay State court found it unnecessary to stretch the
reach of the Medicare Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute that far. "We
need not decide the exact reach of the [Medicare Anti-Fraud and
Abuse] statute since, in this case, the district court instructed that
the defendants could only be found guilty if the payments were made
primarily as inducements. 62 Despite the use of qualifying language
to the contrary, the court did stretch the reach of the statute. In Bay
State, the hospital employee was in no position to refer Medicare
patients because-he was an administrator, not a physician. Yet, be-
cause the employee could improperly use his influence to help secure
a contract under which payments would ultimately be made by
Medicare, the court affirmed the trial court's finding that the statute
had been violated.
57. 874 F.2d. 20 (1st Cir. 1989).
58. Id. at 23-24.
59. Id. at 25-26.
60. Id. at 23-27.
61. Id. at 27.
62. Id. at 30. "The gravamen of Medicare Fraud is inducement. Giving a person
an opportunity to earn money may well be an inducement to that person to channel
potential Medicare payments towards a particular recipient." Id. at 29. Thus, it can be
inferred that the inducement in Bay State was the ambulance company's payment of
compensation to a person in a position to use his influence to secure a contract for the
company where the ambulance company may ultimately be paid by Medicare under the
contract.
III. THE PERCEIVED NEED FOR THE STARK LAW
The main criticism of physician self-referral arrangements is that
they result in the overutilization of services. Overutilization involves
the provision of unnecessary or inappropriate care. The potential
problem has been aptly summarized as follows:
The danger of overutilization is created by the fact that the investing physi-
cian's investment return and profits depend, in part, on referral of patients
to the facility in which he has an [ownership] interest. Consequently, the
investing physician is encouraged to make excessive and unnecessary refer-
rals to the venture in order to increase his investment return.63
Some evidence that physician self-referral arrangements result in
overutilization has been provided by various studies.64 But does the
evidence of abuse by physician-owners support a measure as drastic
as complete prohibition? An analysis of the two most comprehensive
studies to date, the OIG Report and the Florida Study, should have
answered this question. Unfortunately, the studies were inconclusive.
A. The OIG Report
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) studied physician in-
vestment in clinical and physiological 5 laboratories and durable
medical equipment suppliers. 6  Study results varied by the type of
entity. Patients of physician-owned clinical laboratories received
forty-five percent more clinical laboratory services than all Medicare
63. McDowell, supra note 37, at 65.
64. Several studies were conducted prior to the enactment of the Stark Law (Dec.
19, 1989). The OIG Report cited and summarized these studies as follows: MEDICAL
SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, UTILIZATION
OF MEDICAID LABORATORY SERVICES BY PHYSICIANS WITH/WITHOUT OWNERSHIP IN-
TEREST IN CLINICAL LABORATORIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SIX LABORATORIES
(July 9, 1981) (studying Medicaid utilization of clinical laboratories in Michigan and
finding that Medicaid recipients referred by physician owners had an average of 41 %
more tests than those referred by nonowners); HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRA-
TION, REGION V OPERATIONAL REVIEW BRANCH, DIVISION OF HEALTH STANDARDS &
QUALITY, DIAGNOSTIC CLINICAL SERVICES IN REGION V (May 1983) (finding that labo-
ratories owned by physicians are reimbursed more than those owned by non-physicians
and attributing this result to higher prices and higher incidence of service per patient at
the physician-owned laboratories); BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD OF MICHIGAN, MEDI-
CAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, A COMPARISON OF LABORATORY UTILIZATION AND PAYOUT TO
OWNERSHIP (May 9, 1984) (finding that the physician owned clinical laboratories pro-
vided approximately 20% more services per patient than all other laboratories and ap-
proximately 40% more services than non-physician-owned laboratories). OIG REPORT,
supra note 7, at 3-4. The OIG Report itself was released prior to the Stark Law's enact-
ment. In addition, a comprehensive study has been completed and released subsequent to
the Stark Law's enactment. See STATE OF FLORIDA HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT
BOARD, JOINT VENTURES AMONG HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS IN FLORIDA (1991) [herein-
after FLORIDA REPORT].
65. Physiological laboratories perform non-invasive tests such as magnetic
resonance imaging (more commonly known as an MRI) and computerized axial tomog-
raphy (more commonly known as a CAT scan).
66. OIG REPORT, supra note 7, at ii.
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patients in general.6" The OIG estimated that this increased utiliza-
tion of clinical laboratory services cost the Medicare program $28
million in 1987.68 Patients of physician-owners of physiological labo-
ratories received thirteen percent more physiological services than
patients in general.69 In contrast, patients of physicians who own or
invest in durable medical equipment suppliers were found not to use
any more equipment than all medicare patients in general. 0 Accord-
ing to the OIG, the above estimates are considered to be conservative
because no true control group was used in the study."
B. The Florida Report
In 1989, the Florida Legislature mandated that the Florida
Health Care Cost Containment Board (HCCB) conduct a special
study of "joint ventures"7  between persons providing health care.7
3
The study concluded that joint ventures involving clinical laborato-
ries, diagnostic imaging centers (physiological laboratories), and
physical therapy centers have higher utilization rates per patient
than their non-joint venture counterparts. 4 Utilization rates in
clinical laboratories were found to be almost double (3.3 tests per
patient versus 1.7). 5 Use of magnetic resonance imaging (more
commonly known as an MRI), which is a type of diagnostic imaging,
67. Id. at 18.
68. Id. at 21.
69. Id. at 18.
70. Id. at 21.
71. Id. at 18. The results of patients who were referred by physician-owners were
compared to the results of all patients. If a comparison had been made of the results of
patients of physician-owners to those of non-physician-owners, a much greater difference
in utilization would have been expected. See Hearings, supra note 11 (statement of the
Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services). An example of
such a result is provided by the 1984 Michigan Study. See supra note 64.
72. The term "joint venture" as used in the Florida Report is defined as "any
ownership, investment interest or compensation arrangement between physicians (or any
health care professional who makes referrals) and an entity providing health care goods
or services." 2 FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 64, at iii (Sept. 1991). The results of the
study were released in three volumes. Volume I, released in January of 1991, outlined
preliminary results on the prevalence, scope, and nature of joint ventures among Florida
health care providers. Volume II, released in September of 1991, evaluated the impact of
joint ventures on access, utilization, costs, charges, and quality of health care services in
Florida. In addition, this volume contained the final results released in Volume I. Volume
III, released in October 1991, provided recommendations for the regulation of joint ven-
tures with the objective of protecting the citizens of Florida from unnecessary and costly
health care expenditures.
73. Study Enabling Legislation, 1989 Fla. Laws ch. 354, § 6 (1989).
74. 2 FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 64, at v.
75. Id. at III-10 to III-11.
was found to be fourteen to seventy percent higher.76 Additionally,
physical therapy centers averaged forty-three percent more visits per
patient. 7
For other types of health care facilities, the study did not indicate
that physician ownership resulted in higher utilization. Regarding
ambulatory surgical centers, the study found that "there is no evi-
dence that physicians with ownership interest [sic] in ambulatory
surgical facilities tend to perform surgery more frequently. '7 8 Simi-
larly, physician ownership of acute'care hospitals appeared to have
little impact on access, costs, or charges. 9 With respect to radiation
therapy centers, physician-owned facilities rendered less services per
patient than their non-physician-owned counterparts.80 The Florida
Report concluded that the average number of radiation treatments
per patient was 45 for non-joint venture facilities but only 36.8 for
physician-owned centers. 8
Finally, the study was unable to reach a conclusion about the ef-
fects of physician ownership on the utilization of durable medical
equipment suppliers.8 2 Researchers found that the diversity of ser-
vices provided by durable medical equipment suppliers precluded a
meaningful comparison of utilization.
83
The results of the above studies indicate that abuse, in the form of
overutilization, may exist in certain types of physician-owned facili-
ties. The question is how pervasive is this abuse?
Unfortunately, a weakness in the design of these studies makes
this a very difficult question to answer. Neither the OIG nor the
HCCB attempted to assess the medical necessity of the services pro-
vided as a result of the referrals.8 4 Joint ventures have higher utiliza-
tion rates than non-joint ventures, but the reason is unclear. As Uwe
76. Id. at IV-7 to IV-8. Since 93 % of Florida's MRI centers are physician-owned,
a meaningful comparison to non-joint venture centers located in Florida was impossible.
3 FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 64, at IV-1 (Oct. 1991). Therefore, the utilization rates
of Florida joint ventures were compared with utilization rates of Baltimore, Md. Id. at
IV-5. Study researchers believed that Baltimore provided a reasonable basis for compari-
son for two reasons. First, only one MRI center in Baltimore is owned by referring physi-
cians. Second, the two areas have similar proportions of elderly and similar per-capita
incomes. Former Inspector General chief counsel, Harvey Yampolsky, has criticized this
comparison stating that the Florida population studied may be older, sicker, and wealth-
ier than the population in Baltimore. See Doctor Ownership Draws Fire, Medicare Com-
pliance Alert (United Communications Group, Rockville, Md), Oct. 14, 1991, at 2.
77. 2 FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 64, at IX-l0.
78. Id. at 11-2. This finding was attributed to the fact that third-party payors often
require patients to seek a second opinion on recommended elective surgery procedures.
Id.
79. Id. at VII-7.
80. Id. at X-2.
81. Id.
82. Id. at vii.
83. Id.
84. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association,
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Reinhardt, Ph.D., James Madison Professor of Political Economy at
Princeton, and member of the Physician Payment Review Commis-
sion for the United States Congress, explains:
A problem in conducting studies regarding the effects of joint ventures is
that at least two conclusions are possible. The first is that the doctor needs
to break even on the machine and therefore uses it more intensively. The
second is that the doctor may be a test-intensive doctor and may therefore
want a machine on the premises. It is difficult to tease out statistically the
separate effects on each of these scenarios .... Ultimately, we need a study
by clinicians who can judge the appropriateness of care-a clinical outcome
type of study. Another type study could look at a physician's utilization
before ownership and compare utilization after ownership.8 5
The studies, however, presume that the higher utilization rates are
due to the former conclusion without explaining why this conclusion
is more likely.
IV. THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE REGULATORY RESPONSE TO
THE PERCEIVED PROBLEM
Clearly, the legislature should not disregard abusive practices. If
the abuse is widespread, then complete prohibition of the practices
responsible may be appropriate. Alternatively, if the evidence does
not support a conclusion that physician self-referrals result in wide-
spread abuse, then prohibition may do more harm than good. An
analysis of the potential harm is therefore appropriate.
One major criticism of the Stark Law is that "shared laborato-
ries"8 6 are not exempt from the self-referral prohibition. Under the
Stark Law, only group "practice and in-office laboratories are
exempt.a7
Conflicts of Interest. Physician Ownership of Medical Facilities, 267 JAMA 2366, 2367
(1992).
85. 1 FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 64, at D-7 (Jan. 1991).
86. "Shared laboratories" (or simply "shared labs") is a term used in the medical
trade to describe an arrangement where physicians, who share office space but are not
members of the same medical group (or otherwise affiliated), pool their resources to set
up a laboratory for collective use.
87. STARK LAW, supra note 12. The Stark Law provides, in pertinent part:
(b) General exceptions to both ownership and compensation arrangement
prohibitions. Subsection (a)(1) of this section shall not apply in the follow-
ing cases:
(1) Physicians' services. In the case of physicians' services (as defined in
section 1395x(q) of this title) provided personally by (or under the
personal supervision of) another physician in the same group practice
(as defined in subsection (h)(4) of this section) as the referring
physician.
(2) In-office ancillary services. In the case of services-
(A) that are furnished-
Lack of an exception for shared laboratories is problematic for
several reasons. First, the complete prohibition of these arrange-
ments ignores their potential convenience and efficiency. As one
commentator writes, to deny patients access to a laboratory shared
by several independent physicians "simply adds burdens, delays and
hassles to our [physicians'] attempts to provide adequate, timely,
cost-efficient medical care." '88 Requiring physicians to send patients
elsewhere for laboratory testing that otherwise could be performed in
a shared lab (which is typically located in the referring physician's
office, or at least in the same building) hampers both the conve-
nience and the timeliness of the testing. Such a requirement might
even force a physician to give up practicing entirely.89 In addition,
the cost of the tests may be less if performed in a shared lab. One
physician has indicated that a urine test analyzed by her shared lab
costs eight dollars while the other test site in town charges thirty
dollars for the same test.90
Second, prohibiting shared laboratories may result in an unneces-
sary duplication of resources. Instead of sharing the cost of equip-
ment and technicians, each physician would have to bear these costs
individually. The Stark Law encourages such inefficiency because it
(i) personally by the referring physician, personally by a phy-
sician who is a member of the same group practice as the
referring physician, or personally by individuals who are
employed by such physician or group practice and who are
personally supervised by the physician or by another physi-
cian in the group practice, and
(ii) (I) in a building in which the referring physician (or an-
other physician who is a member of the same group prac-
tice) furnishes physicians' services unrelated to the
furnishing of clinical laboratory services, or
(II) in the case of a referring physician who is a member
of a group practice, in another building which is used by
the group practice for the centralized provision of the
group's clinical laboratory services, and
(B) that are billed by the physician performing or supervising the
services, by a group practice of which such physician is a mem-
ber, or by an entity that is wholly owned by such physician or
group practice, if the ownership or investment interest in such
services meets such other requirements as the Secretary may
impose by regulation as needed to protect against program or
patient abuse.
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1989).
88. MEDICARE COMPLIANCE ALERT (United Communications Group, Rockville,
Md.), May 25, 1992, at 1 (citing Letter from James Scott, Jr. M.D. to Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA), Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS)).
89. This concern has been expressed to the HCFA by a California hematologist-
oncologist. To provide leukemia patients with chemotherapy treatments, the physician
must run blood counts and other tests. The lack of an exemption for shared laboratories
would prohibit him from performing this necessary service and would effectively prevent
him from practicing. Id. (citing Letter from Herbert Wohl, M.D. to HCFA, DHHS).
90. Id. (citing Letter from Anne MacGuire, M.D. to HCFA, DHHS).
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exempts referrals made by an independent physician to a laboratory
that he or she wholly owns if the laboratory is located within the
office.9 1 Alternatively, the independent physician can forgo invest-
ment in his or her own laboratory and refer patients elsewhere. How-
ever, this alternative is often more costly and less convenient for the
patient.92
Finally, the Stark Law unfairly places independent physicians at a
competitive disadvantage relative to their colleagues who have in-
office laboratories or who are engaged in group practice. As one
commentator explains:
If several physicians pooled their money in order to purchase superior lab
equipment and hire better technicians than any of them could afford indi-
vidually, they would be forbidden to refer their patients to this free-stand-
ing facility. At the same time, their colleagues with in-office services could
use these freely for their own patients, with the very same dangers of poor
quality, unnecessary or excessively priced services.
93
This discrepancy in treatment between in-office or group practice
laboratories and shared laboratories is difficult to justify. The excep-
tion for referrals to in-office or group practice laboratories is based
on the presumption that any potential abuse will be mitigated by the
referring physician's direct supervision of the services provided. " As-
suming that this presumption is correct,9 5 how is the physician who
makes referrals to a shared laboratory different from the physician
who makes referrals to an in-office or group laboratory? He or she
91. The prohibition does not apply to referrals for certain "in-house ancillary ser-
vices." To qualify for exemption, the services must (1) be furnished by the referring
physician (or an individual who is an employee of the ,physician and who is personally
supervised by the physician), and (2) be furnished in a building in which the referring
physician provides physicians' services unrelated to the furnishing of clinical laboratory
services: STARK LAW, supra note 12.
92. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
93. E. Haavi Morreim, Physician Investment and Self-Referral: Philosophical
Analysis of a Contentious Debate, 15 J. MED. & PHIL. 425, 437 (1990).
94. This can be inferred from a reading of the requirements for the exception of
referrals made for "in-office ancillary services." See supra note 91. In addition, a similar
argument has often been advanced by commentators to explain why the conflict of inter-
est created by referrals to physician-owned laboratories is more insidious than that inher-
ent in the traditional fee-for-service arrangement. See Hearings, supra note 11
(statement of Arnold S. Relman, M.D.).
95. The presumption may in fact be incorrect. One study comparing the frequency
and costs of imaging examinations performed by doctors who used their own in-office
equipment (self-referring) against those of doctors who always referred to radiologists
(non-self-referring) found that the self-referring doctors ordered 4 to 4.5 more examina-
tions than the non-self-referring doctors. Bruce J. Hillman et al., Frequency and Costs of
Diagnostic Imaging in Office Practice-A Comparison of Self-Referring and Radiolo-
gist Referring Physicians, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1604 (1990).
arguably has as much ability to supervise the provision of laboratory
services as a physician who is a member of a group practice. Thus, if
referrals for "in-office ancillary services" are exempt, then referrals
to shared laboratories should also be exempt.
Another problem with the Stark Law concerns the exemption for
self-referrals made to rural providers. Self-referrals are exempt if the
clinical laboratory to which the referral is made is located in a rural
area.9 This exemption is subject to potential abuse by unscrupulous
non-physician-owned laboratory companies because the physician
owners would have to sell their laboratory once they were no longer
the "sole rural providers." As one commentator explains:
[A] group of physicians in a remote area could purchase a magnetic
resonance imager as 'sole rural providers.' If some for-profit corporation
then saw the success of that operation and decided to set up a competing
facility in the same area, the original physicians would be forced to close
down their service - no longer the 'sole' rural providers - and virtually hand
over a monopoly to the new competitors, regardless of their quality of ser-
vices or their prices. One could actually envision a scam of sorts, wherein
such a company could systematically target successful sole rural providers
for easy - and legally protected - take-overs.97
Although Congress had good intentions in creating the rural provider
exemption, its potential for abuse illustrates the difficulty of design-
ing a statute that prohibits only the undesirable conduct.98
V. EFFECT OF THE STARK LAW ON SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION
As stated previously, the Stark Law's applicability is limited to
physician self-referrals to clinical laboratories." However, Congress
is currently considering a bill that would broaden the prohibition on
self-referrals to additional types of physician-owned entities. In addi-
tion, several states have passed, or are considering passing, "Stark-
Type" legislation. Following is a review of this current legislation.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn provides, in pertinent part:
(d) Additional exceptions related only to ownership or investment prohibition.
The following, if not otherwise excepted under subsection (b) of this section,
shall not be considered to be an ownership or investment interest described in
subsection (a)(2)(A) of this section:
(1) Hospitals in Puerto Rico. In the case of clinical laboratory services
provided by a hospital located in Puerto Rico.
(2) Rural provider. In the case of clinical laboratory services if the labo-
ratory furnishing the services is in a rural area (as defined in section
1395ww(d)(2)(D) of this title).
STARK LAw, supra note 12.
97. See Morreim, supra note 93, at 437-38.
98. Id. at 438.
99. STARK LAW, supra note 12.
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A. Federal Legislation
1. Broad Anti-Referral Bill
Although an eleventh-hour compromise between Representative
Stark and others reduced the scope of the Stark Law to clinical labo-
ratories, 00 the potential for expanding its application remained in-
tact. The language of the statute can easily be expanded by striking
out "clinical laboratory services" and inserting additional health care
services.101
This is precisely what a current congressional bill, sponsored by
Fortney Stark and House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt, pro-
poses to do.'0 2 The bill, H.R. 5502, deletes all references to "clinical
laboratory services" and inserts "designated health services."' 03 This
amendment would expand -the application of the Stark Law to in-
clude virtually all ancillary health services by defining "designated
health care services" to mean (1) clinical laboratory services, (2)
100. See supra note 41.
101. STARK LAW, supra note 12, §§ 1395nn(a)(1), (b)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(4), (d)(1),
(d)(2), (d)(3).
102. See H.R. 5502, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
103. Id. § 252. H.R. 5502 expands the Stark Law as follows:
SEC. 252. EXTENSION OF SELF-REFERRAL BAN TO ADDITIONAL
SPECIFIED SERVICES.
(A) IN GENERAL.-Section 1877 of the Social Security Act is further
amended-(1) by striking "clinical laboratory services" and "CLINICAL
LABORATORY SERVICES". AND INSERTING "DESIGNATED
HEALTH SERVICES" RESPECTIVELY, [IN] EACH PLACE EI-
THER APPEARS IN SUBSECTIONS (A)(1), (B)(2)(A)(II)(I), (B)(4),
(D)(1), (D)(2), AND (D)(3), AND (2) BY ADDING AT THE END
THE FOLLOWING NEW SUBSECTION: "(I) DESIGNATED
HEALTH SERVICES DEFINED.-IN THIS SECTION, THE TERM
'DESIGNATED HEALTH SERVICES' MEANS-"(1) CLINICAL
LABORATORY SERVICES, "(2) PHYSICAL THERAPY SER-
VICES, "(3) RADIOLOGY SERVICES, INCLUDING MAGNETIC
RESONANCE IMAGING, COMPUTERIZED AXIAL TOMOGRA-
PHY SCANS, AND ULTRASOUND SERVICES, "(4)RADIATION
THERAPY SERVICES, "(5) THE FURNISHING OF DURABLE
MEDICAL EQUIPMENT, "(6) THE FURNISHING OF PAREN-
TERAL AND ENTERAL NUTRITION EQUIPMENT AND SUP-
PLIES, "(7) AMBULANCE SERVICES, "(8) HOME INFUSION
THERAPY SERVICES, "(9) OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY SER-
VICES, AND "(10) INPATIENT AND OUTPATIENT HOSPITAL
SERVICES.".
(B) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.-Section 1877 of such Act is fur-
ther amended- (1) in subsection (d)(2), by striking "laboratory" and in-
serting "entity", (2) in subsection (g)(1), by striking "clinical laboratory
service" and inserting "designated health service", ...
physical therapy services, (3) radiology services, (4) radiation ther-
apy services, (5) the furnishing of durable medical equipment, (6)
the furnishing of parenteral and enteral nutrition equipment and
supplies, (7) ambulance services, (8) home infusion therapy services,
(9) occupational therapy services, and (10) inpatient and outpatient
hospital services.0
H.R. 5502, at least as to the provisions expanding the ban on phy-
sician self-referrals, is overly broad and-should not be enacted. Many
of the designated health care services for which self-referrals would
be banned either have not been found to lead to overutilization or
have never been studied. 10 5 For example, the Florida Report (which
is considered to be the most comprehensive study of the effects of
physician ownership on utilization conducted to date) found that pa-
tients of physician-owned radiation therapy centers received less
treatments per patient than did patients of non-physician-owned cen-
ters. 106 Similarly, physician ownership of ambulatory surgical centers
and acute care hospitals was not found to lead to overutilization.
107
With regard to the effects of physician ownership of durable medical
equipment suppliers on utilization, the Florida Report was unable to
reach a conclusion.
0 8
2. Prohibition of Self-Referral to DME Suppliers
Another Stark-Type bill has been introduced in the House which
purports to prohibit referrals made by physicians to durable medical
equipment (DME) suppliers in which they have a financial inter-
est.'09 H.R. 3837, which was passed by the House on August 3,
1992, appears to have been directly influenced by the Stark Law.
Other than the difference in application (H.R. 3837 prohibits self-
referrals to DME suppliers instead of clinical laboratories), the lan-
guage of H.R. 3837 is nearly identical to that of the Stark Law.110
104. Id.
105. All of the studies prior to the Stark Law's enactment focused on either
clinical or physiological laboratories. For a listing of these studies, see supra note 64. The
Florida Report, released after the Stark Law's enactment, studied the effects of joint
ventures on (1) ambulatory surgical services, (2) clinical laboratory services, (3) diagnos-
tic imaging services, (4) the furnishing of durable medical equipment, (5) home health
services, (6) acute care hospital services, (7) nursing home services, (8) physical therapy
services, and (9) radiation therapy services. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 64. For a dis-
cussion of the findings of this report, see supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text. The
effects of physician ownership on utilization for several of the designated health services
addressed by H.R. 5502 have never been studied. These services include the furnishing of
nutritional equipment and supplies, ambulance services, and occupational therapy
services.
106. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
109. See H.R. 3837, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
110. Both H.R. 3837 and the Stark Law generally prohibit self-referrals and then
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H.R. 3837 should not be adopted by Congress. The bill has even
less of a justification than the Stark Law. While clinical laboratories
owned by physicians have been found to have higher utilization rates
than their non-physician-owned counterparts,11 DME suppliers
owned by physicians have not.1 2 Therefore, no empirical support for
the prohibition of self-referrals to DME suppliers exists.
B. State Legislation
Physician self-referrals have also been the subject of much debate
in various state legislatures. "Driven by the need to contain costs,
state governments continue to look at bills that would regulate joint
ventures and health care providers' ability to refer to an entity they
partly [or wholly] own."' " As discussed below, these bills are largely
the result of the attention focused on physician joint ventures by the
Stark Law.
1. Florida
The OIG report, which was reported to the United States Con-
gress during the Stark Hearings," 4 prompted the Florida legislature
to order the Florida HCCB to study physician joint ventures. 15 In
its report, the OIG concluded that "[o] f the eight states covered by
the study, Florida had the highest percentage of physicians involved
in joint ventures."" 6 More importantly, the OIG concluded that
"Medicare patients of physician owners in Florida received 40 per-
cent more lab tests, 12 percent more diagnostic imaging tests, and
utilized 16 percent more durable medical equipment than the gen-
eral population of Florida Medicare beneficiaries."" 7
The HCCB's findings, which were issued in the Florida Report,
led to the Florida legislature's enactment of the most comprehensive
proceed to make exceptions for (1) in-office ancillary services, (2) ownership of publically
traded securities, and (3) rural providers.
I11. See supra notes 67, 74-75 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 70, 82-83 and accompanying text.
113. See Terese Hudson, States Extend Message of Stark Referral Bill, Hosp.,
May 20, 1992, at 62.
114. See Hearings, supra note 11 (statement of the Inspector General, DHHS).
115. This can be inferred from a reading of the Executive Summary contained in
Volume I of the Florida Report, which restated the OIG's conclusions as to the effect of
physician ownership of health care facilities in Florida. See I FLORIDA REPORT, supra
note 64, at v (Jan. 1991).
116. Id.
117. Id.
self-referral ban to date."'8 The Florida Bill prohibits self-referrals to
diagnostic imaging centers, rehabilitation services, radiation therapy
services, and clinical laboratories. These four service areas are the
same ones that the HCCB found to lead to higher utilization of
services.' 19
2. California
A very broad Stark-Type bill was introduced in the California
Legislature by Assemblywoman Jacqueline Spier on February 27,
1991.120 Originally, A.B. 819 proposed to make it unlawful for a
health care professional to refer a person to any laboratory, phar-
macy, clinic, or health care facility which is owned, in whole or in
part, by the professional.'
12
A similar version of A.B. 819 was easily passed by the California
Assembly in a fifty-two to twenty-two vote on the Assembly floor.'
22
The Assembly, relying heavily on the conclusions of the Florida Re-
port, ignored opposition by the American Imaging Association
(AIA) and the California Medical Association (CMA).'2 a However,
A.B. 819's broad anti-referral provisions did not fare as well in the
118. The bill was enacted April 8, 1992. See Patient Self-Referral Act of 1992,
1992 Fla. Laws ch. 178 (1992) [hereinafter FLORIDA BILL].
119. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
120. See A.B. 819, 1991-1992 Reg. Sess. (1991).
121. Id. The bill also sought to prohibit these referrals if the professional had a
proprietary interest in the facility to which the referral was made. Id.
122. See CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, 264 ASSEMBLY WEEKLY HISTORY 213 (July
10. 1992). The January 29, 1992 version of A.B. 819 (passed by the Assembly on the
same date) is similar to the original version of February 27, 1991, except that the former
more specifically enumerates the entities to which referrals would be prohibited. The
January 29, 1992 version states:
[iut shall be unlawful for any person licensed under this division to refer a
person to any diagnostic imaging center, clinical laboratory, physical therapy
or rehabilitation facility, or psychometric testing facility which is owned in
whole or in part by the licensee or in which the licensee has a proprietary
interest.
A.B. 819 (as Amended in Assembly January 29, 1992). For a description of the less
precise language of the February 27, 1991 version, see supra note 121 and accompanying
text.
123. See CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 1991-1992, ASSEMBLY FLOOR 2-3 (Jan. 30,
1992) (available in LEGI-TECH, Committee Analysis Function). The American Imag-
ing Association (AIA), which represented outpatient diagnostic imaging centers, con-
tended that physician joint ventures result in increased competition, improved access, and
lower health care costs. Moreover, the AIA stated that it found no evidence to support a
ban of referrals to physician-owned facilities other than with respect to clinical laborato-
ries. The Assembly dismissed these contentions by pointing to the results of the Florida
Report. The California Medical Association (CMA) argued that the existing California
law on kickbacks and disclosure is sufficient to prevent the potential abuse of physician-
owned facilities. The Assembly, referring to the findings of the OIG Report, responded
that physician-owned facilities located in states with disclosure requirements have not
been found to have lower utilization rates than those in states without such requirements,
Id.
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California Senate, where it ran into strong opposition from the
CMA.124 On June 15, 1992, the California Senate drastically
amended A.B. 819, limiting the bill's application to the prohibition
of physician self-referrals in workers' compensation cases.125 Assem-
blywoman Spier apparently underestimated the CMA's lobby power,
describing the confrontation with the CMA as "an encounter with
an 800-pound gorilla.' 26
3. Other States
Some other states are currently grappling with the self-referral is-
sue. In the Illinois General Assembly, a broad anti-referral bill
(seeking to prohibit self-referrals for clinical laboratory, physical
therapy, comprehensive rehabilitative, diagnostic imaging, and radia-
tion therapy services) was introduced by Assemblyman
Matijevich. 127 The New York legislature has recently enacted a bill
banning self-referrals to clinical laboratories and diagnostic imaging
centers. 28 A.B. 7406 applies even in cases where the services are not
paid for with state funds. 29 The bill was signed into law by Gover-
nor Mario Cuomo in August of 1992.130
VI. A BETTER MEANS OF CONTAINING HEALTH CARE COSTS
In passing a law banning physician self-referrals, Congress has
failed to see the "big picture." Assuming for the moment that the
Stark Law can be justified, a significant reduction in health care
costs is unlikely because the referral ban applies only to a small seg-
ment of the physician population.' 3' Meanwhile, the same financial
124. Paul Jacobs, Doctors' Lobby Waters Down Bill on Self-Referrals, L.A.
TIMES, June 24, 1992, at A3. The CMA, reputedly the most free-spending special inter-
est group in Sacramento, has poured $500,000 into lobbying efforts in the first three
months of 1992. Id.
125. See A.B. 819 (as Amended in Senate June 15, 1992). This limitation is sig-
nificant because workers' compensation cases are estimated to account for only four per-
cent of California's annual health care costs. See Mike McKee, Medical Group Does
Surgery on Referral Bill; but Lawmaker's Changes Still Don't Appease CMA, THE RE-
CORDER, June 23, 1992, at 1.
126. Jacobs, supra note 124. Spier felt that A.B. 819 easily passed the Assembly
because the opposition (presumably the CMA) was caught off-guard and admitted that
she made a tactical mistake by not moving the bill quickly through the Senate. Id.
127. See H.B. 4044, Ill. 87th Gen. Assembly., 1991-1992 Reg. Sess. (1991).
128. See A.B. 7406, N.Y. 214th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. 2d,'(1992).
129. Medicare Compliance Alert News Briefs, MEDICARE COMPLIANCE ALERT
(United Communications Group, Rockville, Md.), Aug. 17, 1992, at 5.
130. Id.
131. The OIG Report concluded that 12% of physicians who bill Medicare have
incentives to overutilize services allegedly present in physician joint
ventures remain unchecked for the rest of the population. 132 What is
needed is a means of removing the undesirable incentives from the
entire medical practice population.
One policy alternative is to change to a health care system where
providers are prepaid. For example, physicians providing services to
Medicare beneficiaries could be paid under a capitated plan.
1 33
Under that policy, Congress could make enrollment in an Health
Management Organization (HMO) or other capitated payment plan
mandatory for all Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. To qualify
for participation in the program, an HMO would have to agree to
accept all Medicare and Medicaid applicants for a set payment.
A. Can Prepaid Plans Control Costs?
Prepaid plans have been found to have lower total costs per pa-
tient than fee-for-service plans.134 However, the ability of prepaid
plans to control long term health care costs is debatable. One experi-
ment, which compared the cost experience of a prepaid plan to that
of a fee-for-service plan, found that the costs of the former were
twenty-five percent lower.135 In contrast, other commentators have
concluded that prepaid plans are not significantly less costly than
their fee-for-service counterparts. 3a
ownership interests in entities to which they make patient referrals. See OIG REPORT,
supra note 7, at 11. Thus, the Stark Law applies, at most, to 12% of the physician
population. However, this percentage is likely to be less than 12% because laboratory
tests performed by group practices are exempt from the referral ban. See supra note 87
and accompanying text.
132. Medical treatment in the United States has traditionally been provided on a
"fee-for-service" basis. Wasted Health Care Dollars, supra note 2, at 438. Thus, the
more treatments a physician provides, the more he or she is paid.
133. A capitated plan is one in which providers are paid a fixed amount to cover
all care required by each patient during a set period, regardless of the actual treatment
cost. See Alan L. Hillman et al., How Do Financial Incentives Affect Physicians'
Clinical Decisions and the Financial Performance of Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions?, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 86, 86 (1989).
134. Mark C. Hornbrook & Sylvester E. Berki, Practice Mode and Payment
Method: Effects on Use, Costs, Quality, and Access, 23 MED. CARE 484, 493 (1985).
135. Willard G. Manning et al., A Controlled Trial of the Effect of a Prepaid
Group Practice on Use of Services, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1505 (1984). The cost sav-
ings were attributed to reduced hospitalization rates of nearly 40 % for the prepaid group
(as compared to a fee-for-service group). Id. at 1508-09. Study researchers concluded
that the prepaid group practiced a less "hospital-intensive" brand of medicine than the
fee-for-service group. Id. at 1505.
136. See Harold S. Luft, Trends in Medical Care Costs: Do HMO's Lower the
Rate of Giowth?, 18 MED. CARE 1 (1980) (examining the trends in total health care
costs for Health Management Organization (HMO) members relative to non-HMO
members and finding that HMOs are subject to the same inflationary pressures as fee-
for-service providers); Health Care in Crisis: Are HMOs the Answer?, CONSUMER REP.
519, 526 (Aug. 1992). Consumer Reports rated 46 of the country's HMOs. Id. at 519.
This survey concluded that, while many HMOs reduce out-of-pocket costs for individual
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Regardless of whether prepaid plans are more cost effective than
fee-for-service arrangements, the government will benefit from
adopting a prepaid system for two reasons. First, because the provid-
ers receive the same amount per patient whether or not services are
rendered, at least some of the incentive to overutilize services would
be neutralized."' 7 Consumer Reports has estimated that unnecessary
care results in approximately $130 billion of the annual amount
spent on health care."3 8 Assuming that this estimate is correct and
that all unnecessary care results from the profit incentive to over-
utilize services, changing to a prepaid system would save the govern-
ment $52 billion per year (forty percent 39 times $130 billion).
Second, and more importantly, the government's concern over in-
creasing health care costs would be alleviated because the risk of
increase would be shifted to the providers. 140 Although this shifting
of costs cannot solve the nation's health care crisis, Congress may
have no other choice because the time for bringing the Medicare
system's costs under control is running critically short. "Bush admin-
istration health and financial policy leaders have predicted that at
current expenditure growth rates, the Medicare program's budget
will be running a deficit by 1994, and will exceed in size that of
either Social Security or Defense by the turn of the century." 41 Ad-
ditionally, commentators predict that the program will likely be
bankrupt by the year 2011.142
members, HMOs' ability to hold down national health care costs is less clear. Id. at 526.
Consumer Reports attributed this deficiency to several factors. First, HMO members
appeared to use as many services as non-members. Second, HMOs often reduce costs by
negotiating discounts with hospitals, which may merely increase costs for other users of
hospital services. Third, the fastest growing HMOs are those in which doctors practice in
their own offices and are paid on a fee-for-service basis. This keeps costs up because "[i]n
fee-for-service HMOs, there's pressure to pay physicians fees that are close to those
charged by doctors in traditional practices outside the HMO." Fourth, HMOs have little
ability to control the costs of specialists, which are the most expensive physicians in their
networks. Lastly, HMOs are under the same pressure as traditional providers to invest in
costly new technology. Id.
137. Although profit is the most likely cause of overutilization, other factors such
as individual practice styles and the uncertain nature of medicine also contribute to the
problem.
138. See supra note 2.
139. Medicare and Medicaid accounts for approximately 40% of health care
spending in the United States. Morreim, supra note 9, at 393.
140. Of course, the per-capita payment would need to be adjusted to keep up with
inflation. However, the government would finally be assured of controlling the budget
allocated to health care expenses because the cost per Medicare beneficiary would be a
fixed, determinable amount.
141. Couch, supra note 1, at 243.
142. Id.
B. Do Prepaid Plans Provide Incentives to Underutilize?
Designing a health care policy that removes all improper incen-
tives, while maintaining a high standard of patient care, is difficult.
"All compensation systems-from fee-for-service to capitation or
salary-present some undesirable incentives for providing too many
services, or too few."'143 The most common criticism of prepaid com-
pensation systems is that they provide incentives for providers to
under-treat patients.4 While this Comment has thus far focused on
the potential to overutilize services and the corresponding effect on
costs, the quality of patient care is extremely important and should
be considered by the legislature before enacting a given health care
policy. Accordingly, a brief analysis of this criticism follows.
Prepaid plans, such as HMOs, guarantee a comprehensive range
of services for a fixed price.145 The financial survival of an HMO,
therefore, hinges on its ability to control costs.' 48 Since physicians'
decisions control the use of resources, HMOs often use financial in-
centives directed at the physicians to restrain costs. 47 Therefore, in
theory, the incentives facing physicians who contract to provide ser-
vices to HMOs are the reverse of those present in the traditional fee-
for-service arrangement.
The pertinent question then becomes whether these "reverse in-
centives" adversely affect the quality of patient care. One commen-
tator, Alan Hillman, concludes that the financial incentives
commonly used by HMOs to control costs may create a conflict of
interest which might result in a lower standard of care. 148 However,
the weight of empirical evidence does not support Mr. Hillman's
143. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 10, at 153.
144. "The financial constraints found in health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) encourage the parsimonious use of health care resources." Hillman, supra note
133, at 86.
145. Alan L. Hillman, Financial Incentives for Physicians in HMO's: Is There a
Conflict of Interest?, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1743, 1743 (1987).
146. Id.
147. Id.
In a typical HMO, after an administrative percentage is deducted, the pre-
mium is divided into various special-purpose funds ... to pay for the services
of primary care physicians, specialists, and hospitals and for outpatient labora-
tory tests. The primary care fund is used to pay the primary care physicians,
although a percentage of their payment is often withheld until the status of the
other funds is determined at the end of the year. If there is a surplus, the
HMO may return the withheld amount to the primary care physicians; if there
is a deficit, the withheld funds may be retained by the HMO. HMOs may
share part or all of any surpluses in these funds with the primary care physi-
cians as bonuses. Similarly, HMOs may penalize physicians beyond the with-
held amount.
Id. at 1744.
148. Id. at 1743.
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conclusion. A 1985 article, which summarized the available litera-
ture on the effects of the method of payment on use, costs, quality,
and access to health care, concluded that, except for the California
Medicaid experience, the quality of care has not been found to be
lower in HMOs. 49 Similarly, two recent studies did not find a de-
creased quality of care in prepaid plans, as compared with fee-for-
service arrangements. 150 Neither of these studies offered an explana-
tion for the absence of a decrease in the quality of care. Two expla-
nations are possible. First, prepaid providers are subject to the same
malpractice standards as fee-for-service physicians and, thus, must
adhere to applicable community standards.5 " Second, one might
speculate that the amount of waste in fee-for-service practice is so
great as to allow prepaid plans to provide comparable care at less
cost.
VII. CONCLUSION
Health care costs have risen rapidly over the last decade and were
expected to exceed $800 billion in 1992. Congress has made various
attempts to contain these costs. One such attempt, the enactment of
the Prospective Payment System, has been largely responsible for the
proliferation of outpatient treatment centers. This trend toward
treatment in outpatient settings, in turn, has created incentives for
physicians to invest in facilities to which they refer patients. Because
physicians profit by making referrals to facilities in which they have
an ownership interest, self-referral arrangements have come under
Congressional scrutiny. In the belief that self-referral arrangements
result in the overutilization of services and thereby increase the
amount spent on health care by the federal government, Congress
149. Hornbrook & Berki, supra note 134, at 501. The authors suggest that one
possible explanation for this conclusion is that "HMOs must provide the prevailing com-
munity standard of practice to control their malpractice liability exposure." Id. Further,
the authors speculate that HMOs may invest more in quality assurance than fee-for-
service providers because their corporate form makes for a more attractive litigation tar-
get. Id. at 501-02.
150. See Timothy S. Carey et al., Prepaid Versus Traditional Medicaid Plans:
Lack of Effect on Pregnancy Outcomes and Prenatal Care, 26 HEALTH SERVICES RES.
165 (1991) (comparing prenatal care and birth outcomes for women and children en-
rolled in capitated programs to those treated under fee-for-service arrangements and
finding no demonstated decrease in the quality of care given to the prepaid group);
Timothy S. Carey et al., Prepaid Versus Traditional Medicaid Plans: Effects on Pre-
ventative Health Care, 43 J. CLIN. EPIDEMIOL. 1213 (1990) (testing the hypothesis that
preventative care would be less in prepaid systems and finding that the use of capitated
payments resulted in no apparent diminution of preventative services).
151. See supra note 149.
enacted the Stark Law in 1989.
The Stark Law, which makes it illegal for a physician to refer
patients to clinical laboratories in which he or she has an ownership
interest, is overly broad for two reasons. First, the studies supporting
a ban of physician self-referral arrangements, such as the OIG and
Florida Reports, are inconclusive. While these studies have amassed
statistics which suggest that physician-owned facilities perform more
services per patient than their non-physician-owned counterparts, the
studies failed to analyze whether the prescribed services were medi-
cally necessary. Second, the Stark Law makes an unjustified distinc-
tion between physicians who are members of a group practice and
those who practice independently. Referrals made to a clinical labo-
ratory owned by physicians who practice as a group are exempt from
the ban, while those made by sole practitioners to a shared labora-
tory are not.
More importantly, the Stark Law is unlikely to have the desired
result of significant savings to the government because the referral
ban effects only about twelve percent of the nation's physicians.
Therefore, a more farsighted solution to the government's inability to
control its health care costs is needed. One possible solution is to
require all Medicare and Medicaid recipients to enroll in prepaid
medical plans. The adoption of this policy would finally assure the
federal government of cost containment because the amount spent
per Medicare beneficiary is fixed.
The time has come for Congress to re-examine the nation's health
care policy. Patchwork reforms, such as the Prospective Payment
System and the Stark Law, have failed to adequately contain health
care costs. Unfortunately, while federal and state legislatures con-
tinue to waste precious time and money on these patchwork reforms,
the Medicare-Medicaid system is rapidly becoming insolvent.
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